Secure communication has become of paramount importance in the internet era. The security is based on techniques that encrypt private messages from a sender (Alice) which can only be decrypted by the receiver (Bob) and not by any adversary (Eve). Symmetric cryptographic methods need an a priori exchange of secrets such as encryption keys and authentication keys between Alice and Bob. 1 Asymmetric cryptography has been a major revolution in cryptography by overcoming the key distribution problem and allowing the encryption of messages to Bob with whom Alice does not yet share a secret. Asymmetric cryptography methods such as RSA and Diffie-Hellman key exchange use secret private keys (known only to its owner) together with public keys for security and thus overcome the necessity of a priori sharing a secret.
2,3
The existing asymmetric cryptography methods face two issues. Firstly, they are not information-theoretically secure, i.e. the security relies on unproven mathematical assumptions such as the hardness of factorization or the computation of discrete logarithms. Secondly, digitally stored private keys are prone to stealthy copying (which is not detected by the key owner), thereby compromising the security. Over the last three decades, quantum physics has been exploited to create unconditionally secure cryptography methods such as Quantum Key Distribution, [4] [5] [6] Quantum Key Recycling, [7] [8] [9] Quantum Secret Sharing, 10 and Quantum Secure Direct Communication. 11, 12 These methods utilize entanglement or the unclonability of unknown quantum states to avoid leakage of information to Eve or to detect Eves actions. Nevertheless, the practical implementation of these quantum methods again requires an authentication mechanism on the communication channel between Alice and Bob to prevent Eve from impersonating Bob. The standard approach for achieving this remains a priori sharing of a secret key, which to a large extent defies the purpose of a key exchange method. Indeed, public keys based on quantum states have been proposed as a way to fulfill all the security criteria. 13, 14 However, the use of quantum states as public keys is highly impractical, since it requires long-term quantum storage, and has limited scalability in the number of keys. 13 Hence, there is still need for a practical asymmetric cryptographic method.
An important ingredient for a new cryptographic method are physical unclonable keys (PUKs), also known as physical unclonable functions (PUFs), which have been used as authentication tokens. [15] [16] [17] [18] A PUK is a physical object with complex internal structure that is infeasible to copy due to the massive number of degrees of freedom that strongly Photons in the highlighted yellow or blue spots are collected by a multimode fiber (core diameter indicated by the red circle) and detected on an avalanche photodiode D0 (0) or D1 (1), respectively.
The received bit value is decided based on the difference in the number of photodetections in the two detectors.
affect its response to stimuli. PUKs that can be read out optically are readily realized in opaque scattering media (e.g. white paint, teeth and paper), which consists of vast numbers of randomly positioned particles. A recent development, Quantum Secure Authentication (QSA), verifies the authenticity of an optical PUK by querying it at the few-photon level.
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The security of QSA relies only on the hardness of cloning the PUK or its optical response.
Here we combine PUKs and quantum cryptography: We introduce PUK-Enabled Asymmetric Communication (PEAC) that allows Alice to quantum-encrypt a message on fewphoton wavefronts, which can be decrypted only with Bobs PUK. The security of PEAC does not rely on mathematical assumptions or on the secure storage of secrets, but only on the hardness of distinguishing complicated high-dimensional quantum states. Importantly, PEAC requires only a one-way quantum communication channel between Alice and Bob.
Similar to many asymmetric cryptography methods, PEAC works with a public-private key pair. The private key is the infeasible-to-copy PUK held by Bob. The optical challengeresponse characteristics of Bobs PUK are utilized to form the digital public key. The public key is generated through a one-time optical characterization of the PUK as follows. A plane wave of light is programmed with the help of a digital Spatial Light Modulator (SLM) using complex wavefront shaping or digital phase conjugation in a setup illustrated in Fig.   1 . [20] [21] [22] [23] The SLM offers K degrees of freedom in shaping the wavefront, i.e., K independent phases can be programmed. The wavefronts are constructed such that the light transmitted through the PUK is focused to different locations, illustrated as the grid in the right panel of Our choice of error correction is guided by the level of channel noise. This can be quantified by the channel parameters shown in Fig. 2(A) . The parameters α and characterize the bit-flip and bit-loss probabilities of the channel. The probability for a bit to be transmitted correctly is (1 − )(1 − ). At n = 33 photons per wavefront with K = 900 degrees of freedom on the SLM, we find α = 0.43 ± 0.01 and = 0.59 ± 0.01. These channel parameters were estimated by transmitting 2 15 pseudo-random bits from Alice to Bob. The error rate α is plotted as the red star in Fig. 2(B) . To overcome the channel noise, we employ polar and left of the star, resp.). The channel error rate is estimated by transmitting 2 15 bits, each carrying data i.e. code rate R = 1, over a channel with = 0.59 and α = 0.43 (red star). We design an error-correcting polar code for a codeword of length N = 2 15 transmitted over N virtual channels. Simulations confirm the possibility to achieve bit error rate < 10 −4 for a code rate of
codes, which have been proven to be capacity-achieving. codeword length N for a fixed M improves the error rate of data channels but results in a lower communication speed, i.e. smaller R. Figure 2 (B) shows the maximum error rate of the virtual channels in a codeword with N = 2 15 (shown as black squares) estimated using simulations based on density evolution methods. 25 A code rate R = 2 −9 ≈ 0.002 can be used with this codeword length to maintain a practical limit of bit error rate (BER) < 10 −4 (blue dashed line) for message transmission using polar coding (see Appendix C; Fig. 7 ).
The security of PEAC relies only on one assumption: the quantum-physics-imposed difficulty of determining the used subspace H 0 or H 1 for ψ at low photon number n . Given that this assumption holds, the most generic attack by Eve is to estimate ψ and infer the most likely subspace used in its construction. The most powerful state estimation is known to yield a fidelity F = ( n + 1)/( n + K), 26 from which we calculate the probability for Eve to correctly guess the subspace to be
Here, q is the number of subspaces; in our implementation q = 2. In the limit K/ n → ∞ ,i.e. n K, P Eve → 1/2, which corresponds to a random guess. We define the security parameter S ≡ K/ n to quantify the security, with S > 1 resulting in P Eve < 1. Figure 3 shows the measured photodetections in the correct detector with varying n . The baseline photodetections are the detector dark counts which impede Bobs measurements at lower n . 8 ). After the error correction step, Eves partial information is reduced to zero using privacy amplification. Note that we assume the worst-case scenario in which Eve intercepts all the signal photons from Alice with perfect detectors. In contrast, the BER for the Alice→Bob channel is estimated for the imperfect detection (54%) and collection (50%) efficiencies of the PUK transmission achieved in our setup.
In conclusion, we demonstrate an asymmetric encryption scheme that does not require storage of any digital secrets. Its security is derived only from quantum physics and the technological infeasibility to make an optical device that copies the complex optical behavior of the physical key of the receiver. It can be deployed stand-alone or in tandem with classical cryptography; the latter case yields a strong multi-factor encryption with unprecedented 
Appendix B: Security analysis
We analyze the security of PEAC under the following assumption. It is infeasible to realize an optical device that projects any wavefront ψ b ∈ H b to symbol b. Eve has knowledge of Bob's public key and the details of the symbol encoding scheme used by Alice and Bob.
In this case, the most generic attack is to estimate the state ψ and infer the most likely subspace used in its construction. The most powerful state estimation method is known to yield a fidelity F ≤ ( n +1)/( n +K), where n is the mean photon number per wavefront and K is the number of degrees of control on the SLM. 26 Letψ denote Eves estimator for
Let the correct subspace H x , with x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}, be spanned by an orthonormal system {ψ, v 2 , v 3 , , v K/q }. Averaged over random PUKs, the probability for Eve to correctly guess x is given by
Here we have used F ≤ ( n + 1)/( n + K) and | ψ |v j | 2 ≤ 1/K. The latter inequality holds because an unconstrained average over the random vectors |v j in the K-dimensional space would yield 1/K, whereas our average excludes the favorable direction ψ. The binary case realized in our experiments can be retrieved by setting q = 2. For n K, P Eve → 1/q, which is equivalent to a random guess of the correct basis.
Using the above result, we can calculate the channel capacity between Alice and Eve I AE to be
where the binary entropy function is h(x) = x log 2 1x + (1 − x) log 2 1 ((1 − x) ). The channel capacity for a binary symmetric erasure channel between Alice and Bob I AB can be written using the channel parameters and α as 
Appendix C: Polar codes
Polar codes are linear block-error-correction codes, which are mathematically proven to be capacity achieving for memoryless binary channels. 24 Lets consider a binary channel W which maps input X ∈ {0, 1} to output Y with channel capacity I(W ) = I(X; Y ), see N ) → 1, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }\F ) i.e. the virtual channels are polarized. In the limit of N → ∞, the fraction of good channels approaches the channel capacity I(W ), i.e. the Shannon bound. Information is transmitted over the good channels, while fixed values (frozen bits) known both at encoder and decoder are assigned to the bad channels.
Polar codes are channel-specific codes, where the selection of good channels is a critical step for polar coding. The polar codes are designed by estimating and ranking the reliability of the polarized channels. This involves the optimization of the encoder and the decoder.
The encoder combines the data bits with frozen bits (say, set to 0) and prepares a code word. An (N, M, F ) polar code can transmit M data bits as an N -bit long codeword X = X 1 X 2 . . . X N with |F | frozen bits using the following mapping:
where F are the set of indices of the frozen bits, F C = {1, 2, . . . , N }\F are the information bit indices, u = {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u N } are the uncoded bits and GN is the encoding matrix. The notation G N (F ) denotes the submatrix of G N formed by the rows with indices in F . The encoding matrix G N is defined as follows: using a density evolution method. At lower error rates, the ratio of the number of Alice-Bob to Alice-Eve reliable channels is seen to increase.
We consider the channels with p e < 10 −4 as reliable, i.e. good. As illustrated in Fig.   7 (B), error correction will also allow Eve to decode using her reliable channels, with a fraction of them common between Bob and Eve. This will result in a loss of secrecy in the communication. We overcome the loss of secrecy by imposing a constraint on the choice of the reliable channels in the design of the polar code. of the number of reliable channels for transmitting message bits, i.e. a lower code rate R, but with minimal overlap of reliable channels between Bob and Eve.
The performance of the designed polar codes is shown in Fig. 8(A) as the bit error rate (BER) of the data bits with varying R. The BER is simulated by using a CRC-aided SCL decoding algorithm. A BER < 10 −4 for the Alice→Bob channel is achieved for R < 0.003
with an unconstrained polar code design. We estimate the BER for the Alice→Eve channel to be > 0.05 for this design. By imposing the reliability constraint in the selection of polarized channels, the polar codes achieve a BER for the Alice→Eve channel of > 0.12 and for the Alice→Bob channel of 10 −5 at a lowered code rate R ≈ 0.002. Imposing an even stricter constraint in the selection of secure reliable channels to ensure that the BER of Alice→Eve channel is 0.50 will further lower the code rate, which can be prohibitive for communication. To understand the disparity in the information shared between Alice and
Bob and Alice and Eve in a codeword transmission scheme as used here, it is necessary to consider the frame error rate FER, i.e. probability of having at least one bit error in the decoded message. The FER for the designed polar codes is shown in Fig. 8(B) . At R ≈ 0.002, the FER of Alice→Bob channel is < 10 −4 for both the constrained (p AE e > 0.001) and the unconstrained polar code. The FER for the Alice→Eve channel is 1, which demonstrates that for the selected code rate R ≈ 0.002, the polar codes efficiently correct errors only on the Alice→Bob channel.
